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The role of Evangelical NGOs in International Development 
A comparative case study of Kenya and Uganda1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the public role of a new type of Christian mission in sub-Saharan Africa: 
evangelical Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Since the early 1980s, NGOs have played 
an ever more prominent role in development co-operation. Yet within the non-governmental 
sector, faith-based organisations now seem to excel secular organisations, both in number and 
budget. Their growing recognition can be explained in terms of their expanding international 
networks and well-established local alliances, as well as their steady supply in private funding 
and voluntary work force. Faith-based NGOs, it will be argued, represent a vital component in 
the globally expanding evangelical network between the northern and southern hemispheres: By 
helping to advance church-planting campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa, faith-based NGOs 
broaden the international support bases for conservative Christian groups in North America. In 
the fall of 2001, President George W. Bush approved a new government programme that aims 
at expanding the share of religious organisation in the domestic and international welfare sec-
tors. This paper examines the link between foreign missionary interventions and the privatisa-
tion of public services with reference to the education sector in Kenya and Uganda, and as-
sesses the political implications of these developments. 
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1 This paper is based on field work carried out in Kenya and Uganda from June to September 2001 and January to 
May 2002. The field work forms part of a doctoral thesis that was submitted to the University of Freiburg in Sep-
tember 2003. 
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Much academic literature has been produced so far on the “third wave” of Christianity, the 
charismatic revival that has let to a mushrooming of Pentecostal churches especially in the 
developing world since the 1980s. And more recently, Europeans have, at times nervously, 
observed the growing visibility of Christian conservativism in American public discourse. Little 
efforts have yet been made to investigate how these developments may be connected to one 
another. This paper argues that fundamentalist and charismatic Christianity have gained 
much common ground in the public realm of both Western and African societies in recent 
years, by uniting people with similar social and political concerns in a globally expanding 
evangelical network. Thus, whilst the contemporary international evangelical movement re-
lates to conservative social agendas in Africa, its success at church-planting and –franchising 
around the world has strengthened the position of right-leaning Christians within the main-
stream American public. As a movement without centralised organisation and hierarchical 
structures, evangelicalism has been able to spread rapidly within the informal development 
market. Both development and faith-based organisations arrange themselves on a familiar 
pattern: a tendency to multiply by splitting and re-joining in loose associations, and a ten-
dency to cover territory rather than take root, implying a high degree of flexibility and 
adaptability to different social and political environments. Both secular and religious mission-
aries strive in the domains of health and education. In the wake of structural adjustment and 
privatisation policies in the developing world, NGOs have been entrusted with the delivery of 
public services on a hitherto unknown scale. Especially in the domain of education, it will be 
argued, evangelical missionaries can make a lasting impact on social and political formation 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Before assessing the evangelical missionary factor in Kenya and 
Uganda, however, this paper will briefly look at the movement’s historical narrative, its con-
temporary political concerns and its interventions in American foreign policy towards the 
developing world.  
 
 
 
The Evangelical Movement 
 
In his World Christian Encyclopedia, David Barrett refers to evangelicals as Great Commission 
Christians, that is, Christians who claim a divine mandate to urgently safe as many souls as possi-
ble before Christ’s Second Coming, believed to be immanent. He counts 647.8 Mio. adherents in 
this group, the majority of which are to be found among the 523.7 Mio. Pentecostals, as well as 
revivalist Protestants and charismatic Catholics (Barrett et al. 2001: 23, 25). 
 The religious market of the United States has always been pluralistic. It is therefore 
difficult to catch the various contemporary religious streams along denominational lines. Thus, the 
evangelical missionary movement emerged at the dawn of the 20th century and drew massive 
financial support from various Protestant congregations across the anglophone world. It sprang 
from the protestant Holiness revival that spread among Methodists, Quakers, Presbyterians and 
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Baptists. Pentecostalism, although institutionally distinct, is closely associated with the world-wide 
charismatisation of Christianity during this period. Pentecostalism has been described as a faith-
based movement of the African-American diaspora and immigrant communities, as socially het-
erogeneous and grass-roots oriented. Towards the late 1970s and early 1980s, the label “Black 
Pentecostalism” emerged in the academic literature and the term “African Independent (or Insti-
tuted) Churches” (AICs) now designated autonomous African Pentecostalism. This terminology 
suggests a growing awareness about the distinctiveness of independent, local forms of Pentecos-
talism with little or no missionary incentive, and an expanding evangelical Pentecostalism with a 
strong missionary zeal that appeared to break with much of the charismatic movement’s original 
social dynamic. In contemporary Kenya and Uganda, the two groups can be identified with two 
distinct umbrella organisations, the Organisation of African Instituted Churches and the Evangeli-
cal Fellowship of Kenya and Uganda, the national chapters of the World Evangelical Alliance. 
Whilst the membership body of AICs has been shrinking since the 1970s, evangelical Pentecostal 
churches have multiplied during the same period. In both countries, evangelicals make up be-
tween 25-30% of the population, whereas traditional Pentecostals amount to a mere 10% (Bar-
rett et al. 2001: 25).2  
 Christian Fundamentalism, an inter-denominational Protestant movement, made its first 
appearance at the beginning of the 20th century, parallel to the emergence of Pentecostalism. 
The term was coined by a series of pamphlets published under the title The Fundamentals in 
1912. The movement attacked secularisation tendencies, evolution theory and historical relativ-
ism both within society and the church and promoted the reconstruction of society according to 
the patriarchal model of the Hebrew Bible. Its philosophy of “social-reconstruction” lends to the 
promotion of economic liberalism and a rejection of the welfare state that would weaken patriar-
chal dependencies. Baptist televangelisers Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson stand in the tradition 
of Christian Fundamentalism. They joined with Pentecostals like Oral Roberts and Billy Graham to 
form, in their own words, “the largest and most active conservative grassroots political organiza-
tion in America”,3 known as the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition and the Religious Right. The 
Moral Majority was promoted by Falwell in 1979 in an attempt to move Fundamentalists from 
their hitherto isolated position into a mainstream conservative block that would have sufficient 
weight to make an impact on national politics. 4 Susan Harding, in her analysis The Book of Jerry 
                                                          
2 Note that the distinction between traditional and evangelical Pentecostalism is not always evident and that 
numbers could vary for both countries. Generally speaking, AICs are more numerous in Kenya than in Uganda.  
3 See self-presentation of the Christian Coalition of America, http://www.cc.org/aboutcca/index.html [as of 
16/07/03]. 
4 Falwell organised a pro Reagan march in Washington in the 1980 election campaign and invited Reagan to speak 
at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention at his Thomas Road Baptist Church. The Christian Coalition 
was founded in 1989 by Pat Robertson after his defeat in the Presidential elections in 1988. With Falwell’s Moral 
Majority disappearing in the late 1980s, Robertson took over many of its followers. Falwell later re-emerged as 
leader of Liberty Alliance, an integral movement of the Christian Coalition. Robertson promotes, among others, a 
messianic reading of the Bible that urges America’s divine obligation towards the Holy Land. He toured Israel 
several times and received a State of Israel Friendship Award from the Chicago chapter of the Zionist Organisa-
tion of America in summer 2002. He has also been credited with a questionable involvement in diamond trade in 
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Falwell, assumes that the “Moral Majority moniker” was a public relations stunt in which Falwell 
appeared as the self-initiated leader of a Christian value coalition in national public life (Harding 
2000: 20). The merger with Protestant and Pentecostal congregations and their globally expand-
ing evangelical missionary movement was an important factor for the Religious Right’s growing 
public recognition from the early 1980s onwards. The new alliance also contributed to a domi-
nance of right-leaning evangelical and Pentecostal groups over more liberal forces within these 
movements.5 
 The Pro-Family movement that formed in response to the 1973 Supreme Court ruling on 
Roe v. Wade, repealing state bans on abortion, is Falwell’s brain child (Harding 2000: 20). The 
movement did not become vocal immediately after the court decision but by the early 1980s it 
had become a central focus of the Religious Right movement in the United States. The move-
ment’s main concern is to protect the family against influences which it broadly defines as secular 
and liberal. In the 1990s, Pro-Family groups had taken their concerns to the global level via the 
international evangelical movement. 
 
 
 
The Religious Right and Global Population Policy 
 
In 1994, the United Nations’ population conference in Cairo agreed that education must spear-
head global population policy.6 Among other things, the conference agreed that rising literacy 
levels among women would postpone the age of marriage and reduce the number of children, 
thus improving children’s health and prospects for education.7 The Cairo declaration was en-
dorsed by 179 nations, including the United States under the Clinton administration, but was 
rejected by a number of Arab countries and by the Holy See delegation. Similar to the arguments 
of the original vetoes, the Pro-Family movement stresses that Western, and increasingly non-
Western societies are under attack from “secular ideologies” which devaluate the (traditional 
nuclear) family and labour towards their numerical decline. As Martin noted in Foreign Policy, 
“[t]he same values that underlie the Christian Right’s domestic policies also drive its international 
agenda. Religious activists have consistently opposed any foreign-policy initiative that might 
                                                                                                                                    
war-torn Liberia and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. According to Dena Montague, Robertson invited 
Laurent Kabila to the United States in order to discuss business relations shortly before Kabila took power in 
1996 (Montague 2002: 4). 
5  On the phenomenon of amalgamation of Pentecostal with US-evangelical and Protestant Fundamentalist 
churches in Africa see Brouwer et al. 1996: 156f. For a more comprehensive discourse analysis on contempo-
rary charismatic Christianity in Africa see also Kamphausen 1999: 63-71. 
6  See Programme of Action of the 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and Development,  
    Chapter IV: Gender equality, equity, and empowerment of women, online document, 
    http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/Cairo/program/p00000.html [as of 01/08/03]. 
7  Ibid., Chapter XI, Education, population and sustainable development,  
    http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/Cairo/program/p11001.html [as of 01/08/03]. 
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weaken parental control over children, facilitate abortion, expand the rights of homosexuals, or 
devalue the role of the conventional housemaker and mother.” (Martin 1999). Pro-Family cam-
paigners have argued that the export of contraceptives from the industrial to the developing 
world constitutes a paternalistic policy which imposes a “secularist ideology” on “religious socie-
ties” in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.  
 With this critique, the Pro-Family movement echoes the opinions voiced by many Third 
World governments concerning some of the United Nation’s socio-political agendas and their 
underlying normative concepts. Whilst many policy-makers and diplomats from the South may 
seek to draw attention to the asymmetrical power relations in multi-national forums by challenging 
Western supremacy on an ideological level, for others, some of the UN’s perspectives on human 
development may in and by themselves be objectionable. Religious groups have thus become 
defenders of normative ethics associated with social and cultural settings. Hence, with the grow-
ing integration of local and global political processes, religious conservatives increasingly find 
more in common with religious conservatives of other faiths than they do with non-conservatives 
within their own faith traditions. According to Jennifer Butler, a representative of Ecumenical 
Women 2000 Plus, the social and political campaigns of religious groups at multilateral organisa-
tions “present a radical realignment of religious and political interests.” (Butler 2000: 4) 
 Religious groups have become ever more prominent in UN forums and continue to ex-
tend their role in shaping international public policy. Yet observers stress that it are conservative 
groups that constitute the new religious prominence, at the expense of liberal religious groups 
whose presence has been declining in recent years (see for instance Numrich 2001: 53-68). 
However, conservative Christian groups not only comprise of different Christian denominations but 
have formed alliances with conservatives of other faith traditions. Colum Lynch, UN correspondent 
for the Washington Post, summarises this trend as follows: “Conservative U.S. Christian organiza-
tions have joined forces with Islamic governments to halt the expansion of sexual and political 
protections and rights for gays, women and children at United Nations conferences.” He quotes 
Austin Ruse, founder and President of the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, a Pro-
Family organisation with UN consultative status, “We have realized that without countries like 
Sudan, abortion would have been recognized as a universal human right in a UN document.” 
(Lynch 2002). It is this seeming contradiction between theological fundamentalism and institu-
tional ecumenism which characterises conservative evangelicalism and which constitutes its 
political significance. 
 Pro-Family health and ethics research centres in the United States have registered NGOs 
specifically for the purpose of seeking delegate status with the UN and gaining access to UN 
conferences.8 These NGOs made their first appearance at the Bejing+5 women’s conference in 
2000 where, according to observers of the meeting, they were less engaged in advocating their 
                                                          
8  It is noteworthy that the Religious Right movement is organised around major think tanks, such as the Family 
Research Center (FCR) of Gary Bauer in Washington DC, with an annual budget of 14 Mio. USD and a permanent 
staff of 120. For a more detailed treatment of Religious Right institutions (see Braml forthcoming 2004: 13). 
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own policy agendas than in disrupting meetings and blocking the adoption of programmes and 
agendas in several health and development related forums.9  
 Butler stresses that the organisers behind these grassroots interventions who registered 
several NGOs at the conference, all have well established links to the Republican Party. She adds 
that “the agenda of this ‘Pro-Family’ coalition has been shaped by US politics and represents a 
spill over of US politics into the NGO community and international arena. The rhetoric and polari-
zation brought by ‘Pro-Family’ forces echo that of the current Republican Congress and Religious 
Right in the US. The rhetoric and strategies of the ‘Pro-Family’ forces also echo current struggles 
between the Religious Right, moderates and liberals in mainline Protestant churches in the US.” 
(Butler 2000: 9). Hence, if we believe Butler, it are political actors that seek the alliance of reli-
gious movements, rather than vice versa. 
 A central figure in this coalition appears to be Rev. Sun Myung Moon, previously known 
as a critic of the United Nations and supporter of a unilateral US foreign policy (see Moon 1986). 
The Moon organisation, also known as Unification Church, which disappeared and re-emerged 
several times in the US public arena since its support campaign for President Nixon during the 
Watergate scandal, has registered three NGOs at the United Nations.10 Moon built up an impres-
sive business empire in the Americas, yet he is said to having established a voluntary organisa-
tions’ empire during the 1990s as well, with more than 1,000 NGOs being linked to his church 
(Paine et al. 2001: 3). 
 Taj Hamad, a key figure of Unification Church and director of International Religious 
Foundation, one of Moon’s three NGOs with UN consultative status, established the World Asso-
ciation of United Nations Non-Governmental Organizations in 2000, renamed the World Associa-
tion of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO) in the same year. The organisation, founded 
shortly before the United Nations Millennium Summit, presented itself as central umbrella organi-
sation for NGOs at the UN, and it appeared to challenge the role of the longstanding Conference 
of NGOs in Consultative Status with the United Nations. Rev. Chung Hwan Kwak, director of the 
Moon run Interreligious and International Federation for World Peace (IIFWP) is board chairman 
of WANGO, and Dr. Wally N’Dow functions as WANGO’s secretary general, a Gambian who served 
as Secretary General of the Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements and as 
Officer in Charge of the United Nations Center for Human Settlements (Habitat) in Nairobi. N’Dow 
also appears as contributor to “Dialogue and Harmony Among Civilizations: The Family, Universal 
Values, and World Peace”, a report of the World Culture and Sports Festival 2001, funded by Rev. 
Moon which, although not formally linked to the UN, was held at various UN premises in New York. 
                                                          
9 Thus, according to Butler’s report, the World Youth Alliance, a group comprising mainly of young men from the 
Washington area who were little informed about the issues they sought to advocate, were employed to target 
specific forums to outvote Pro-Choice NGOs. In other instances, participants of the meeting were intimidated 
when “a group of cassocked Catholic friars surrounded individual women’s rights activists and began to pray, 
holding hands around them.” (Butler 2000: 7). 
10 The three NGOs with UN representative status are International Religious Foundation (IRF), Women’s Federation 
for World Peace, (WFWP) and Family Federation for World Peace (FFWP). For more information see Paine et al. 
2001. For a more general treatment, see “ The Economist, 7-13 November 1998. 
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The event was co-sponsored by Iran, the League of Arab States, Tajikistan, the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference, and Indonesia. It hosted a peculiar assembly of ex-officials, amongst 
others former UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former President of Poland Lech Walesa, a 
former governor general of Canada, the former presidents of Uruguay, Micronesia, and Barbados, 
and George Bush Sr.’s Vice President Dan Quayle.  
 Moon’s inter-faith campaign is several years old. In 1996, the Unification Church 
launched the conference Empowering the Muslim Family, co-hosted by the African-American 
Islamic Institute and The Association for the Research of Middle Eastern Cultures. The conference 
was attended by 150 guests from Africa and the United States (Mesbah 1996). Looking at more 
recent events, it becomes obvious that Moon’s coalition with selected Islamic and Third World 
countries formed in the mid 1990s. The Indonesian mission appears to be one of WANGO’s main 
supporters. The missions of Mongolia, Iran, the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Mozambique and Uganda, all sponsored WANGO conferences, 
of which almost a dozen were held in 2000 and 2001. The attendance of ex-officials, such as 
Oscar Arias of Costa Rica or Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia was also a repeating pattern.  
 One month after the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, WANGO organised a confer-
ence entitled The Millennium Declaration of the United Nations: A Response from Civil Society that 
was again held at UN premises.11 The conference sought to promote the establishment of a 
religious assembly within the United Nations’ formal structures, a UN council consisting of reli-
gious leaders. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, WANGO organised a confer-
ence Global Violence: Crisis and Hope in October 2001, featuring familiar guests such as Dan 
Quayle, the former Indonesian President Wahid, and Rev. Dr. Jerry Falwell. Once again, the as-
sembly stressed the need for greater involvement of religious and non-governmental actors at 
the national and international governance level to solve global problems (see Walsh 2001). 
Further, since 2000 WANGO organises an annual conference called the United States and the 
United Nations where the regular guests meet up with Congressmen, UN officials, and representa-
tives of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The event is sponsored 
by IIFWP, the University of Bridgeport, the Washington Times Foundation, and the World University 
Federation, all of which are owned by Rev. Moon (Rothmeyer 1984: 23-71). 
 In 2002, the Bush administration decided to withhold funds worth 34 Mio. USD from the 
United Nations Fund For Population Activities (UNFPA) and to withhold another 200 Mio. USD 
from programmes in support of reproductive health and HIV/Aids education in Afghanistan. Funds 
were also withheld from the World Health Organisation, and USAID was advised to withhold funds 
from NGOs with reproductive health programmes in developing countries.  
 The United States made an effort to pull out from multilateral forums so as to seek an 
independent approach to global population policies, and it did so on the pretext that UN popula-
tion programmes would promote abortion and promiscuity.12 Even the highly appraised new anti-
                                                          
11 See the conference report, online document:  www.wango.org/activiti/index.html [as of 07/02/03]. 
12 For instance, John M. Klink, who had previously represented the Vatican at the Cairo summit and also functioned 
as the Holy See’s spokesman for the Vatican’s withdrawal from UNICEF in 1996, was appointed to represent the 
United States at several UN population conferences since 2001. Klink has rejected much of the UN’s population 
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HIV/Aids scheme appears to be a continuation of this line, channelling funds to unilateral pro-
grammes carried out increasingly by the private sector and especially by “faith-based organisa-
tions”, i.e. NGOs run by religious organisations.  
 In December 2002, President Bush announced the establishment of so called centers for 
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (FBCI). This follows a number of similar provisions that 
were ratified already under the Clinton administration, including the International Religious Free-
dom Act passed in 1998 which emphasised the protection of religious groups around the world 
as a US foreign policy priority; and the so called “charitable choice provision”, an amendment 
which Senator John Ashcroft made to the Welfare Act in 1996 and which drew criticism because 
he did so without issuing a public statement in advance of the ratification.13 FBCI is launched 
among others at the Department of Agriculture and at USAID, with an office at the White House 
being assigned to the programme.14  
 Faith-based and community organisations have played an ever more prominent role in 
international development in the course of the 1990s. Before the launching of this programme 
however, USAID channelled funds for family planning programmes to secular and faith-based 
NGOs at about equal proportions. At this stage, it is not clear whether this policy will change in the 
medium term due to the introduction of the FBCI programme. According to members of the NGO 
community, many faith-based organisations remain sceptical about government funding as they 
fear it could undermine their autonomy. They would rather not rely on funding that is tied up with 
party political agendas which, after all, may change with the next elections. The programme is 
certainly not confined to evangelical organisations and yet many of the larger faith-based devel-
opment NGOs belong to the conservative evangelical spectrum. Thus it is likely that those larger 
evangelical NGOs like Samaritan’s Purse and World Vision which are already on the government’s 
pay role may be able to extent their current budget through the new scheme.15 
 Summarising these developments, the American Pro-Family movement has a growing 
impact on United States’ and United Nations’ policies towards Africa in three ways: Firstly, privati-
sation of public welfare is being promoted through NGO campaigns at government level. Sec-
ondly, a specific operational approach is being promoted at the national and international levels 
that favours the support of faith-based organisations as agents of international development. And 
thirdly, the lobbying of religious freedom in US domestic politics, limiting state interference with 
church groups and widening the space for religious groups in schools and the general public, has 
                                                                                                                                    
policy as promoting abortion in the Third World. See The New York Times, 25 May 2001, and The Wall Street 
Journal, 25 May 2001. 
13 The bill permits public social services to be administered inside churches, grants a right to religious contractors 
to discriminate in hiring employees who are paid with tax-payers funds; and it grants all religious organisations 
a statuary right to contract with a state agency for the delivery of social services. 
14 See the White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives, online document: 
     http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/ [as of 05/06/03]. 
15 For instance, in 2001 World Vision received 1,3 million USD worth of funds from USAID for projects targeting 
infant mortality and maternal health in Kenya and 3,25 million USD worth of funds for a micro-enterprise loaning 
scheme in Uganda, see Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) online registry: www.pvo.net/usaid/. 
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impacted on foreign policy agendas as well. As a result, pressure is put on aid receiving govern-
ments to open up public space for religious groups they have traditionally treated with scepti-
cism.16  
 
 
 
Evangelicalism in Kenya and Uganda 
 
Evangelical NGOs target rural areas in development countries where church planting missions 
cannot reach. They are a major force in what is commonly referred to as “frontier mission” which, 
unlike church-planting campaigns, is still the domain of Western missionaries. Through develop-
ment projects they create friendly environments for the establishment of domestic evangelical 
church communities. Since the projects undertaken both by missionaries and evangelical devel-
opment workers have common interests, they share part of their networks and resources at the 
local level.  
 In an article published in early 2002, Julie Hearn points out that “the US evangelical 
missionary project has an annual income of two billion dollars, equivalent to one fifth of aid trans-
ferred by NGOs worldwide, yet it is the impact that it has made in the Third World that makes it the 
formidable actor it is today.” (Hearn 2002: 40). Given the recent policy shift in US aid distribution, 
funds that are withheld from family planning organisations are increasingly channelled through 
faith based organisation. The movement’s impact will gain additional momentum. Hearn further 
remarks, “as NGOs, [mission organisations] have become valuable partners in implementing US 
objectives in Kenya.” (Hearn 2002: 56). Among these objectives she lists the supervision of 
population growth, the combat of HIV/Aids, and the privatisation of health services.  
 
 
 
Privatisation in Kenya and Uganda 
 
The donor community became increasingly wary of government corruption in Africa towards the 
mid 1980s. Almost simultaneously, all major donor countries changed their aid distribution poli-
cies, effecting a dramatic increase of NGOs in numbers and budgets. The number of NGOs enjoy-
ing consultative status at the Economic and Social Council at the UN has grown from 41 to 1,350 
since the council’s inauguration. Within less than a decade, the total amount managed by NGOs in 
Africa has more than tripled, from 1 billion USD in 1990 to 3.5 billion USD in 1998 (Chege 
1999:1). Between 1995 and 2000, the United States were channelling 35% of aid through 
                                                          
16 The investigations of the Ugandan police following the Kanungu massacre and closure of some Pentecostal 
churches, were criticised by the United States International Religious Freedom Report. See International Reli-
gious Freedom Report 2002: Uganda, online document: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13861.htm [as of 
04/05/03]. 
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NGOs,17 and a similar policy has been adopted by the World Bank. The share of World Bank 
sponsored projects involving NGOs increased from less than 10% in 1990 to over 40% in 2001 
(World Bank 2003).  
 The official development aid (ODA) paid out at government level has decreased accord-
ingly. ODA’s share in government expenditure has declined all over sub-Saharan Africa. In 
Uganda, ODA fell only little from 835 Mio. USD in 1995 to 819 Mio. USD in 2000. With a 76.8% 
share in government expenditure, Uganda’s aid dependency is among the highest on the conti-
nent. In Kenya, the shift was more dramatic with ODA falling from 734 Mio. USD in 1995 to 512 
Mio. USD in 2000, and ODA share in government expenditure dropping from 28.5% to 16% 
(World Bank 2001). 
 In Kenya, the World Bank’s and IMF’s decision to withdraw government funding was 
consequential. Although financial assistance provided through these organisations fell short of 
ODA provided by unilateral donors, the bank’s withdrawal was significant in that it discredited 
Kenya’s government as exceptionally corrupt. In Kenya, both corruption and political repression 
were systemic during the 1980s and early 1990s. Western donors partially followed the bank’s 
line by channelling more aid through the informal sector whilst implementing financial sanctions to 
put pressure on the Moi government. Given the peaceful democratic transition in December 
2002, that followed the introduction of a multi-party system in 1992 and a constitutional review 
process with broad public participation, it could be argued that this donor policy was met with 
success. International pressure could unfold a positive influence on political reform because it was 
backed up by internal pressure, coming from rights organisations, churches, the media, and the 
Kenyan public at large. Another effect of the cutback of ODA, however, was the rapid growth of 
the informal aid sector.  
 Health and education used to be the domains of missionaries in colonial Kenya and 
Uganda. Upon independence, the Kenyan and Ugandan governments sought to appropriate 
these sectors and integrate them into a state managed welfare systems. In Kenya, these attempts 
failed in the long run due to insufficient capital reserves. “Mzee” Jomo Kenyatta became synony-
mous with the patrimonial ruler, using state resources and government assets to deliver to his 
own constituency and to bribe political opponents, rather than developing a social welfare system 
that would suit the country’s needs and abilities. Building on the Gikuyu tradition of self-reliance 
that had emerged during colonial times, Kenyatta institutionalised voluntary self-help initiatives 
known as Harambee, “pulling-together”. Thus, long before the term “NGO” was established in 
international development speech, Kenya had its own community based voluntary sector. While 
churches provided health and education, Harambees built and maintained roads, wells, bridges, 
market stalls and other municipal buildings. These efforts, however, were not autonomous from 
the state but formed part of its system of patronage (Barkan 1992: 177). From the perspective 
of Statehouse, Harambee fulfilled two purposes: firstly, it reduced the financial strain put on 
central government budgets; secondly, it tied local leaders to their rural constituencies and kept 
                                                          
17 U.S. Agency for International Development, President Bush Approves Faith-Based Office for USAID, USAID Press 
Release 138 (2002), 12 December 2002. 
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them busy with organising local activities rather than interfering with national politics. Public 
demands were de-politicised and their scope was limited to community concerns, thus shielding 
politicians in the capital from their local electorate. The outcome was a steady improvement of 
infrastructure in the Central Province, building on substantial colonial infrastructure along the 
railway running from the coast via Nairobi to Lake Victoria. The areas south and north of this strip 
remained desperately underdeveloped by contrast.  
 Between the mid 1970s and late 1980s, the number of NGOs active in Kenya rose by 
229% (Kameri-Mbote 2000: 2). Structural Adjustment Programmes that were implemented in 
Kenya during the same period led to a shrinking of government budgets allocated to social ser-
vices. NGO activities complemented public services and filled the gaps where the state had de-
fected. Moreover, unabated regional imbalances in resource distribution and growing political 
repression under the one-party regime of Daniel arap Moi furthered the mushrooming of advo-
cacy and rights organisations during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 In Uganda, the public sector eroded soon after independence and eventually collapsed 
during the Amin years. Because of the disintegration of the administration, state-building efforts 
were impeded right from the start. While state managed infrastructure deteriorated where it 
existed, church run institutions continued to receive funding from Western partner organisations. 
As a consequence, church run schools and hospitals were able to maintain and extend their 
services. With its decentralisation policy, the Ugandan Movement government has undertaken a 
state-building effort from the community level upwards. Local governments have been given 
powers to collect taxes, to enforce civic law, and to implement community projects formerly 
administered by the central government. In southern and eastern Uganda, where infrastructure 
remained relatively intact and where conditions for agriculture are favourable, these measures 
have been met with moderate success. In the western and especially northern parts of the coun-
try, where violent conflicts continue to inhibit the development of infrastructure and soil and 
climate are less favourable, local efforts would often arrive at little. Generally speaking, the 
amount of taxes collected at the district level does not suffice to substantially improve living 
conditions. International and national NGOs as well as community based organisations (CBOs) 
that are sponsored by larger NGOs or development agencies operate as the main service suppli-
ers in these areas. CBOs are not unlike the Kenyan Harambee initiatives: whilst they are formed 
by locals for community based projects, they need to satisfy the expectations of foreign develop-
ment agencies or central government ministries in order to secure funding. 
 In Uganda, much foreign aid is channelled to local NGOs, either directly or through the 
Ugandan government. Many country-wide development projects were introduced by NGOs where 
no government agency was previously active. In addition to the development of physical infra-
structure and improvement of agricultural production, the Ugandan government contracts NGOs 
for civic education, gender, ethics, and HIV/Aids campaigns. While Kenyan NGOs were able to 
build autonomous structures or to build on existing ones, NGOs in Uganda are often outlets of 
government agencies. 
 Janet Museveni, who worships at Kampala Pentecostal Church, an offshoot of the Cana-
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dian Pentecostal Assemblies of God, and at the Church of the Universal Kingdom of God, a church 
run from Brazil, acts as patron of several evangelical charities. She has established a partnership 
with Samaritan’s Purse, an organisation of Billy Graham’s son Franklin which co-ordinates several 
USAID sponsored Aids projects, and collaborates with Tear Fund, an NGO created by Bono, lead 
singer of the Irish rock band U2. These activities are part of a wider continental trend towards the 
establishment of major quasi-governmental NGOs. In 2002, the first ladies of 18 countries of sub-
Saharan Africa launched the African First Ladies Organisation Against HIV/Aids in Davos. The 
organisation’s primary mission is of a diplomatic nature: it seeks to encourage co-operation 
between neighbouring countries and regions, as well as to lobby for support in the United States 
and Europe. Yet all participants are running their own national charity organisations. In Gabon 
and Cameroon, charity foundations created by the first ladies now channel far greater amounts of 
money for the fight against the disease than the respective ministries of health. Due to the grow-
ing visibility of these organisations in society and their impressive financial means they attract 
skilled labour force from the civil services into their ranks.  
 The Ugandan policy to register churches only in conjunction with a charitable project has 
resulted in the accreditation of over 2,000 HIV/Aids projects, the majority of which are affiliated 
with an evangelical church.18 Moreover, churches themselves are registered as “faith-based 
NGOs”, the number of which climbed over 600 alone between 1992 and 2000. They constitute 
roughly 20% of the total number of NGOs registered during that period in Uganda (Kasigaire 
2000). However, virtually none of the registered “faith-based NGOs” are voluntary non-profit 
organisations. Uganda has no statute for the registration of churches as church, society, or 
association, hence registration with the NGOs board is the only means to obtain clearance from 
the government. Yet registration with the board allows churches to gain tax-free status as organi-
sations and entitles them to apply for government funding, credit schemes, and development aid, 
even if no social or advocacy function is involved. The implication is that a church is free to oper-
ate like an NGO and to hand in proposals for public development projects. NGO registration 
applies to domestic as well as foreign churches and mission agencies.  
 The Kenyan legislation is slightly different: Churches are not required to register as NGOs 
unless they have actually founded a non-profit voluntary organisation operating in relevant fields. 
In theory, church run schools are registered with the Ministry of Education, Science and Technol-
ogy, and church run clinics are registered with the Ministry of Health. Churches and mission 
agencies, by contrast, are registered under the Societies Act. Although the system itself appears 
to be more transparent, the handling of these statutes is often rather ambivalent. In practice, 
many organisations that fail to register under the Societies Act, or cannot obtain clearance from 
the relevant ministry, end up registering an NGO. Kenyan and international human rights organi-
sations have repeatedly demanded that the Societies Act be revised so as to limit the possibility 
                                                          
18 Interview Uganda AIDS Commission, August 2001. See also Lacey 2003. 
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of arbitrary denial of registration.19 The Societies Act also gives far-reaching power to authorities 
to de-register organisations on suspicion of irregular business practice. The same applies to the 
Non-Governmental Organisation Act, whilst matters are further complicated by the existence of 
two parallel institutions dealing with NGOs: The NGO Coordination Bureau of the Office of the 
President where all national and international NGOs are registered and de-registered; and the 
NGO Council that deals with additional administrative matters but has no autonomous powers 
(Kameri-Mbote 2000: 5).20 
 The degree of government patronage over the NGO sector is high both in Kenya and 
Uganda. Whilst government authorities can easily withdraw the legal status of disfavoured organi-
sations, there is little obligation and limited capacity to execute transparent control over NGO 
activities. Aili Mari Tripp constitutes about the situation in Uganda that “although there is little 
regulation of NGO activity, the fact that regulatory laws are in existence means that they can be 
enforced if the regime feels sufficiently threatened by various activities.” (Tripp 2000: 62, empha-
sis added).  
 
 
 
Private schools 
 
Evangelical NGOs are increasingly active in the field of formal education. Already before the recent 
introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE) in Kenya, the Moi government committed itself 
to the programme Basic Education for All (BEFA). The Kenyan Ministry of Education introduced a 
private partnership scheme for the promotion of BEFA in which it targeted specifically religious 
organisations. Given that government funding was considerably lower in this sector than in other 
sectors of education, NGOs held the majority stake in BEFA even before the introduction of UPE. 
The Kenyan government provided 50% of the funding of primary education, 90% of which was 
paid for teachers’ salaries (Ogachi: 2002: 2f.). Hence, only 10% of the expenditures for con-
struction, maintenance and teaching materials were covered with public funds. The remaining 
costs are covered by parents, church communities, and NGOs, mainly the larger faith-based 
organisations such as PLAN International, the Christian Children’s Fund, and Compassion Interna-
tional.  
 The Kenyan government has now begun to implement UPE, one of the key pre-election 
promises of Mwai Kibaki who was inaugurated as Kenya’s new president in January 2003. Like in 
Uganda, around 70% of education expenditures now go to primary level education so as to cope 
                                                          
19 See for instance a report by Eddie Adiin Yaansah and Barbara Harrell-Bond, Wolfson College, Oxford, “Regulat-
ing the non-governmental sector: the dilemma”, online document: http://www.fmreview.org/rpn191.htm [as of 
03/11/03].20 
20 For instance, the Kenyan think tank Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION) was de-registered by 
the Bureau upon demand of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) on pretext of subversive activities after it had 
published a report on corruption in Kenya. According to CLARION, the Bureau had not consulted the NGO Coun-
cil on this matter, as required by the constitution. 
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with the massive influx of new students. Recent studies suggest that enhanced financial efforts 
still fall short of UPE demands. A study of the Ugandan education sector compiled for the World 
Bank’s Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) in 2001 finds that “although 
resources have been provided to increase the number of teachers, textbooks, and classrooms in 
the country, these increases have been overwhelmed by the dramatic upsurge in enrolment. (...) 
[T]here are indicators, particularly in rural areas, that the majority of students are not able to 
read and write even after six years of primary school.”21 In Kenya, prospects are not much better. 
Even before the recent launching of UPE, the Assistant Minister of Education has found that there 
is a shortage of 5,000 teachers in secondary schools and a shortage of 9,000 teachers in pri-
mary schools, “but the government cannot recruit because it has no money and the World Bank 
has said ‘no’” (Onyango 2002). Instead, demands for cost-sharing have let to a considerable 
rise of tuition and admission fees at secondary and tertiary levels.22 The situation is further com-
plicated by the fact that privatisation of public schools and introduction of cost-sharing arrange-
ments have not been implemented in accordance with official procedures. Many schools charge 
irregular extra tuition fees. Moreover, many teachers seek to boost their meagre salaries by 
teaching private classes in the afternoon. According to a report for the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), teachers often refuse employment with schools in poor 
neighbourhoods where residents cannot afford extra-curricular tuition.23 Apparently, this problem 
is not limited to disadvantaged rural areas. In Nairobi, almost half of the children between six and 
13 years of age are out of school. Of the other half that are enrolled, 53% drop out at primary 
level.24 The report also stresses that poor urban areas suffer greater shortage in adequate 
school buildings than do rural areas. In Nairobi, this affects approximately 60% of the population. 
Yet the report makes an interesting recommendation: rather than rushing to build more schools, 
the government should consider giving grants to existing schools set up by churches and NGOs 
so that they can expand their facilities.25 Already under BEFA, the Kenyan government invited 
churches to become stakeholders in its public schools. For instance, Africa Gospel Church spon-
sors 344 primary schools and 63 secondary schools and co-ordinates the schools’ religion 
                                                          
21 Kevin A. Makokha, The Effects of Public Expenditure Policies on the Education and Health Care under Structural 
Adjustment, p. 161., online document: web.forumsyd.se/Arkiv/uploaded/SAPRI_8_PubExpend.pdf [as 
of25/04/03]. 
22 Secondary education can cost up to 30,000 KSh (345 USD), higher education fees stand at around 50,000 KSh 
(875 USD) per annum. Most state employed teachers earn less than 5,000 KSh (66 USD) per month, so that 
their salaries would not cover the costs of the degrees they once studied for. Fees and salaries are estimates 
based on oral sources. 
23 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Kenya: Feature – The Challenge of Providing 
Free Primary Education, quoted in: IRIN Africa-English Service, 07 February 2003. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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classes. The church collected 35,221 USD for this purpose via its Indiana based World Gospel 
Mission.26 
 Africa has ten larger evangelical universities, the number of smaller private institutions of 
the evangelical tradition being much higher. One of the largest private religious universities is the 
Methodist African University which was established in 1992 in Zimbabwe, amongst others with the 
support of USAID. Another prominent institution is Daystar University. Setting off as a technical 
college in the 1960s, it began offering Master’s courses in collaboration with the US evangelical 
universities Wheaton College and Messiah College in the 1970s. Eventually Daystar moved to 
Nairobi where it enrols nearly 2,000 full-time students.  
 Next to the three public universities, Jomo-Kenyatta-University, Moi University, and the 
University of Nairobi, Kenya has ten private universities, two of which are Catholic, one is Vedic, 
and three are Evangelical. The Kenya Conquerors Business Directory, an evangelical yellow 
pages, lists over a dozen evangelical colleges and universities.27 Among those that have been 
accredited by the Ministry of Education is Africa Nazarene University, founded in 1993 in co-
operation with Olivet Nazarene University, Illinois,28 Kenya Methodist University founded in 1995 
in collaboration with Andrew United Methodist Church in Kathleen, and Hope Africa University 
established in 2000 with support from Free Methodist Church and Greenville College, Illinois. The 
African Inland Church’s Scott Theological College, founded in the 1960s, was granted university 
status in 1997. Uganda has seventeen universities, all of which were founded in the 1990s, with 
the exception of Makerere University. The majority of these newer institutions are faith-based, 
including three Islamic, one Anglican, one Catholic, and three Evangelical universities.  
 Education at evangelical universities is not inexpensive. Daystar University for instance 
charges a total of 138,700 KSh (1,819 USD) in tuition, admission and examination fees per year 
for a BA. Daystar stresses that its tuition fees are modest compared to European and North 
American standards, and that it are the contributions of individual well-wishers, churches, and 
Christian organisations that keep the costs low. Still, the University of Nairobi merely charges 
18,900 KSh (248 USD) for government sponsored students, and 87,900 KSh (1,153 USD) for 
private students on its BA programmes.29  
 Unlike the Anglican, Catholic and Islamic institutions, evangelical universities put much 
emphasis on business administration, accounting, IT, and teachers’ training, with theology being 
taught at some of these universities but not all. There are hardly any courses offered in the 
humanities and social sciences. The emphasis on technical skills reflects the curriculum of evan-
gelical secondary schools which focus mainly on technical training and little highlight religious 
                                                          
26 see the organisation’s field report, online document: www.wgm.org/cms/Fields/cmsFieldShow.asp?did=91 [as 
of 14/05/03]. 
27 Harvest Time Travel (ed.), Kenya Conquerors Business Directory, Nairobi, 2001, pp. 51-55. 
28 The Church of Nazarene is one of the largest Pentecostal churches in the United States and worldwide. The 
church’s health ministry and church planting mission is present in virtually all countries of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Nazarene has theological colleges in Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria, 
some of which may soon be up-graded to University status. 
29 The enrolment fees are published on the universities’ website: University of Nairobi: www.uonbi.ac.ke, and 
Daystar   University: www.daystarus.org. 
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education. In fact, the assets they market in advertisements is their low cost/high quality service. 
Rather than religious formation being presented as among the schools’ primary objectives, it is 
promoted as accessory of marketable leadership quality. This responds to students’ needs who 
often choose a Christian college not because it is Christian but because faith-based institutions 
grant them access to foreign private sponsorship and thus make secondary education more 
affordable.  
 Both local educators and foreign sponsors stress leadership qualities as a major contri-
bution to economic development in Africa. As a lecturer at Kenya’s Nazarene University states, 
“The technological level of Kenya has been rising rapidly in the past few years, and those busi-
ness and computer majors who have done their studies well feel prepared to ‘ride the wave’, as it 
were, helping their country find its own technological and economic footing.”30 Daystar University 
says in an advertisement inviting foreign students to join its academic exchange programme, 
“The real war is for the minds of Africa’s youth. But in the heart of Africa, on the front lines of that 
battle, a Christian college has educated 5,000 leaders for that crucial continent and for the 
world.”31  
 The introduction of universal primary education and cost-sharing arrangements has 
opened up another field for NGO activity in Kenya and Uganda. Evangelical NGOs have been able 
to extent their local networks through public-private partnership in this sector. Moreover, a com-
prehensive network of evangelical higher education is build through private sponsorship and 
development co-operation. In many areas, these evangelical networks excel the infrastructure 
maintained by mainline church organisations. Giving the plans of the Bush administration to 
channel more funds through faith-based NGOs, it appears likely that an increasing number of 
evangelical organisations will cater both for basic and higher education in the developing world. 
 
 
 
Evangelical Politics in Kenya and Uganda 
 
As we have seen, Statehouse and the Office of the President retain some control over mission 
agencies and their affiliate churches. However, this circumstance, which affects secular NGOs 
much the same, would not in itself allow for the conclusion that faith-based organisations act on 
behalf of government interests. And yet, many evangelical mission agencies embrace a political 
theology that promotes economic initiative and competitiveness, whilst encouraging submission 
under authoritarian leadership in the political domain. Moreover, in an attempt to extent their 
support bases in the countries where they operate, evangelical missionaries and local evangelical 
church leaders have tended to lend support to the authoritarian regimes of former President 
                                                          
30 Tim Crutcher, lecturer in Theology and Biblical Studies, Nazarene University, online document:  
     http://www.nazarene.org/iboe/riie/Didache/Didache_vol2_2/culture.html [as of 08/04/03]. 
31 Journey of the Heart, An Opportunity to Experience the Miracle of Daystar, student exchange programme, online 
document: http://www.daystarus.org/joh2.htm [as of 08/04/03] (emphasis added). 
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Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, as well as to the Ugandan Movement regime of President Yoweri 
Museveni.  
 Kenyan politics stumbled into crisis with the gradual establishment of a one-party regime, 
growing political repression and the collapse of the economy from the mid 1980s onwards. Moi’s 
government came under increasing internal as well as external pressure to lift its ban on political 
parties. The first peak of the crisis was reached with the President’s move to abolish the secret 
ballot box and introduce a queuing system instead.32 The patterns of conflict that emerged during 
the so called “queuing crisis” had a lasting impact on the relationship between religious and 
political leaders. The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the umbrella organisation of 
Kenya’s Protestant churches, was among the most vocal organisations to protest the new 
scheme. NCCK was attacked from several officials of the ruling party on suspicion that it acted on 
behalf of foreign interests – presumably British interests –, determined to destroy the unity of the 
nation. The Gikuyu based African Independent Pentecostal Church, as well as the US-evangelical 
Full Gospel Church and United Pentecostal Church broke away from NCCK during the queuing 
crisis, arguing that they were opposed to political polarisation that would undermine national 
unity. The evangelical African Inland Church, to which President Moi was affiliated, also distanced 
itself from the council, saying it was becoming too political. However, the church’s leadership has 
not officially resigned from NCCK. The defecting Pentecostal churches came together in the Ken-
yan Evangelical Alliance, now Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya (EFK), and African Inland Church 
took over its chairmanship. This double affiliation of the President’s “own church” as well as the 
hasty inauguration of the evangelical umbrella organisation gave rise to the widespread percep-
tion that EFK was created out of convenience.  
 Following the second freeze of a World Bank credit scheme amidst increasing internal 
and external pressure to lift the ban on political parties, the President in his New Year’s speech of 
1995 promised to call in a commission to review the constitution. Following this announcement, 
NCCK which for several years had actively been lobbying for the repeal of section 2a – the article 
limiting political competition – emerged as one of the main organisers of the participatory review 
process. The process was put on halt several times due to disagreements over legal procedures. 
When the 1997 elections were approaching, the leaders of Kenya’s mainline churches, Catholic 
Archbishop Ndingi, Anglican Bishop Gitari, the chairman of the Episcopal Conference John Njue, 
and NCCK chairman Musyimi held several private talks with President Moi in an attempt to per-
suade him to allow for minor constitutional changes. Moi refused and suggested that the 
churches be joined by Hindu and Muslim leaders as well as EFK to make their campaign more 
representative. An inter-faith coalition, “Ufungamano”, was formed, however, when disputes 
arose over the nomination of representatives, the evangelical churches jointly split from the rest 
of the group. 
                                                          
32 With the establishment of a de jure one-party regime, President Moi became increasingly wary of the possibility 
of an internal mutiny. The queuing system, after which each citizen would line up behind his candidate and the 
winner would be determined on the basis of the length of the queue, would have helped Moi to control party 
loyalties. 
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 When Ufungamano came together at its inauguration, Anglicans, Methodists, Catholics, 
Muslims and Hindus joined in an ecumenical prayer during an open-air mass at Nairobi’s Uhuru 
Park. As the meeting commenced, EFK which had abstained the gathering, had called for a 
counter prayer in the same venue during which sermons were read that sought to discredit 
Ufungamano as political opposition in religious cloth.33  
 Bishop Kitonga, vice president of EFK and leader of Redeemed Gospel Church, among 
Kenya’s largest evangelical churches, published a paid-up interview in the newspaper Daily Nation 
few weeks after the “prayer incident” at Uhuru Park, in which he explained: “As for his rapport 
with the Government and loyalty to its leader, Bishop Kitonga says he upholds the teachings of 
the Bible that advocate respect for the king and the Government of the day. ‘If that is being an 
apologist, so be it,’ he says. He refers to the book of Romans 13 Verse 1, which reads: ‘Everyone 
must obey the state authorities because no authority exists without God’s permission, and the 
existing authorities have been put there by God.’” The interviewer challenges Kitonga, a Ugandan 
by birth, about a ruler like Idi Amin and asks whether he was put in power by God. Kitonga con-
firms, “when the church in Uganda ceased to pray and became lukewarm, Amin emerged from 
nowhere [sic] and started leading the country. It was God’s ammunition.” Kitonga and his fellow 
Christians prayed for divine intervention and Amin was eventually overthrown. The same applies 
to Kenya: change is to be achieved by prayer which will be effective if God permits.  
 Although the debate about the constitutional review process has ebbed in recent times, 
the polarisation between evangelicals and mainline churches persists. In March 2002, members 
of the Gikuyu based Mungiki group34 stormed into the Luo dominated Kariobangi residential area 
and massacred all adult men that happened to cross their way. This incident, in which 21 people 
were killed, spurred fears of tribal clashes in the wake of the upcoming elections. Representatives 
of the Catholic, Anglican and Methodist churches called for an ecumenical memorial service at the 
site. On this occasion, the bishops deplore the fact that police had not intervened as the killings 
commenced for more than one hour and wondered how it was possible that 300 armed youth be 
transported in trucks and buses to Kariobangi without being noticed by security personnel.35  
 Evangelical pastors did not participate in the service. A spokesmen of the Evangelical 
Alliance of Africa, the continental evangelical umbrella organisation which shares a building with 
EFK, confirmed in an interview with the author that they had not been invited but admitted they 
would not have followed such an invitation. He argued that the gathering had not in fact been a 
memorial service but a political rally: “The statements that were made were supposed to be 
prayer but it was almost like a political campaign. They use the cloak of religion to attack. Instead 
we should have taken this as an opportunity to call for a national day of repentance. All of us, 
admitting that we have done wrong, collectively, not pointing at the leaders in government, and 
                                                          
33 See Daily Nation, and the East African Standard, 12-16 April 2000. 
34 Mungiki is an ethno-religious group that draws on Christian, Islamic and Gikuyu traditions, however, it is not 
affiliated with any of the evangelical or mainline Christian churches. 
35 Daily Nation, 06-08 March 2002. 
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asking God to have mercy upon us. That is what I think when I look at the unity of prayer.”36 
Although evangelicals refer to themselves as holistic, and occasionally may even explain their 
holistic worldview in terms of an African school of thought, the concepts of “dualism” and “ho-
lism” are understood in a peculiar way. Holism in the evangelical case implies a radical separation 
of religious and secular spheres that would allow for the application of concurring identities, such 
as citizen, patriot, or Christian. For evangelicals, religious and political processes run parallel and 
can replace one another – at the leaders’ discretion. 
 In Uganda, church-state relations are dominated by a polarisation between the Anglican 
and Catholic churches.37 Traditionally, Anglicans have maintained amicable relations with 
consecutive regimes in Uganda, while Catholics have tended to lend their support to the 
Democratic Party, one of the larger opposition groups now restrained by the ban on political 
parties. Evangelical church leaders have so far kept a low profile in politics, however, it must be 
noted that part of the Anglican Church of Uganda (COU) belongs to the evangelical spectrum: 
Other than in Kenya, the East African Revival took firm root in the Anglican church as what in 
Uganda is known as the Balokole (“born-again”) movement. The East African Revival goes back 
to evangelical missionary endeavours of the colonial era. Because the former presidents of 
Uganda, Amin and Obote, restricted foreign missionary intervention, evangelicals frequently 
operated under the auspices of COU, hence the strong evangelical leaning of the church. The 
Anglican Archbishop Livingstone Mpalanyi Nkoyooyo himself is a Mulokole. 
 More recently, religious leaders have spoken out against the war in the north and have 
commented on Museveni’s move to change the constitution so as to allow him to stand for a third 
term in the 2006 presidential elections. Cardinal Wamala, head of the Catholic Church in Uganda, 
criticised the government for failing to work towards a cease-fire with the rebels, and in his Easter 
message of 2003 appealed to political leaders to reject the constitutional amendment for a third 
term.38 The Anglican leader responded by urging Ugandans to stop discussing the issue alto-
gether, a warning that had previously been issued by the President himself.39 The two church 
leaders found themselves in a similar polarisation in the run up to the controversial 2000 refer-
endum with which Museveni sought to postpone the introduction of a multi-party political system 
through popular vote: Immediately after the Cardinal had issued a statement in which he criticised 
the idea of holding a referendum on the country’s political system, the Anglican Archbishop 
issued one supporting it (Onyango-Obbo 2003).  
 Museveni who used to keep at a distance to the leaders of all religious groups, has come 
to chose evangelical churches as venues to address the nation on religious holidays. Evangelicals 
and Balokole appear to assemble themselves behind the President who, in an attempt to secure 
support from the evangelical leadership, has emphasised his born-again status on occasion. 
                                                          
36 Interview with the spokesman of the Evangelical Alliance of Africa, Nairobi, March 2002. 
37 Note that both churches claim memberships at about equal proportions, with some 40% of Ugandans being 
Roman Catholics and 30% being Anglicans. On the Anglican-Catholic divide in Uganda, see also Gifford 1998: 
116ff. 
38 The Monitor, 17 April 2003. 
39 AllAfrica, 11 July 2003. 
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Political rallies of evangelicals are rare in Uganda but may become more frequent once the politi-
cal market opens. In an unprecedented incident, the Anglican Archbishop led a demonstration 
through Kampala city centre in protest against pornography in the media. According to press 
reports, the crowd was chanting “parliament, save us from pornography!” and “Joseph Koney 
and [Ugandan porn-magazine editor] Richard Tusiime are the Axis of Evil!”.40 The rally had been 
organised by the Family Life Network, a New York based “family centred” broadcasting ministry 
that has opened a branch in Kampala. The demonstrators were addressed by Scott Lively of the 
American Family Association, a Religious Right organisation that is involved in HIV/Aids campaigns 
across Africa. According to Lively, Uganda’s high rate of teenage pregnancies is to be blamed on 
“increased consumption of pornography.”41  
 Uganda has become a magnet for faith-based organisations under the Museveni presi-
dency. All larger international evangelical NGOs are operating in Uganda, and local evangelical 
organisations are mushrooming. The NGO-isation of Uganda’s welfare sector coincides with an 
increase of US aid in support of Uganda as a regional strategic ally. However, Uganda’s privileged 
role is a legacy of the Clinton administration. It is worth noting that Uganda also hosts among the 
largest number of independent women’s rights groups in sub-Saharan Africa, most of which 
formed in the late 1980s and early 1990s when “women’s empowerment” was popular among 
donors. Faith-based NGOs are now advancing as the same organisations have gained increasing 
influence in the United States’ public arena.  
 It seems plausible that the persistence of authoritarian political regimes in Kenya and 
Uganda facilitated the advance of extra-parliamentary political lobbies. Previous to the recent 
lifting of the ban on political parties, Kenya was ruled by a one-party government, de facto since 
independence, and de jure since 1982. Popular movements, community initiatives, the party’s 
youth’s and women’s wings, all had been incorporated into the party machinery. Throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s when dissent was countered with state violence, international church 
organisations and, to a lesser extent, international academic and professional networks filled the 
void left by the disintegrating opposition parties. In Uganda, where the ban on political parties 
remains in place, women’s organisations, professional lobby groups, and internationally affiliated 
rights observers have been able to influence Movement agendas, if only to a limited degree. In 
both countries, the monopolisation of political space has meant that independent external actors 
have been able to influence local politics via NGOs and extra-parliamentary pressure groups.   
 The major difference between religious leaders’ interventions in Kenyan and Ugandan 
politics can be attributed to country specific variables. The rift between Kenyan evangelicals and 
mainline churches can almost exclusively be explained in terms of the latter’s strong political 
engagement. The evangelical counter-campaign, whether sponsored by the government or not, 
was reactive and aimed at impeding political participation. In Uganda, the evangelical quarter has 
                                                          
40 The East Africa, 19 May 2003, and AllAfrica, 13 May 2003. 
41 See the American Family Association’s online journal, July 2002, http://www.afa.net/journal/july/2002/noi.asp 
[as of 25/08/03]. 
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not gained much political profile. Given the absence of concerted political action on the part of the 
mainline churches, the need for counter-action did not arise.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Structural adjustment programmes have encouraged the involvement of NGOs both at the local 
and international levels of development co-operation since the 1980s, thus improving the general 
climate for NGO activities. The significance of faith-based NGOs in development co-operation is 
increasing as a result of the intervention of conservative religious groups in American foreign 
policy and at the UN. Accordingly, conservative evangelical groups are in a better position than 
mainline and liberal groups to exploit the growing public recognition of faith-based organisation in 
international development. These developments have allowed evangelicals to extent their net-
works in Kenya and Uganda respectively.  
 The infrastructure created by foreign evangelical missionaries is predominantly business 
and technology oriented. Rather than building institutions that are maintained and directed by 
Westerners, evangelical missionaries have build close ties with expanding local networks which 
incorporate autonomous local church and business empires. Trans-national and inter-continental 
networks provide missionaries with financial means independent of the state. They can secure 
public funds through pressure groups that back domestic and foreign policy agendas. Lay com-
munities thus continue to play an important role in financing the privatisation of public services. 
Once basic services and facilities are established, missionaries can access government funds 
both nationally and internationally. Evangelicals maintain an extensive network of NGOs that reach 
out into peripheral rural areas. This NGO force integrates local interest groups into global net-
works.  
 Eventually, the trans-national coalitions that arise from these missionary campaigns may 
be of growing relevance to the church and society in the West. Christianity’s growth in the South 
and its embrace by conservatives world-over is something which, according to some observers, 
many people in the West tend to ignore. Philip Jenkins, author of a recent study on global Christi-
anity, points out that the Anglo-American quarter of liberal reformers present  a minority even 
among the 6% Americans within the Roman Catholic Church: From a global perspective, if they 
would advance their reform agendas, this would lead to some kind of an “American schism” 
(Jenkins quoted in Bacon 2002). The recent quarrels in the world-wide Anglican Communion 
illustrate this conflict: The evangelical Institute on Religion and Democracy, formed to counteract 
the mainline protestant National Council of Churches in the United States, has sought the help of 
Anglicans in the developing world for its campaign to get the Anglican Communion “back on 
track”. Thus, Ugandan and Nigerian Anglicans were among the fiercest opponents to the promo-
tion of a gay Anglican priest to the office of bishop in the United States and threatened with 
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breaking away from the communion.42 The language has sharpened in the wake of viable alterna-
tives. After all, the contemporary evangelical movement presents itself not as a missionary enter-
prise of Westerners to save souls in the developing world, but as an international business and 
value coalition. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Der folgende Essay befasst sich mit einer Form christlicher Missionierung im sub-saharischen Af-
rika deren politische Bedeutung erheblich zunimmt: den evangelikalen Nicht-Regierungs Organi-
sationen (NROs). Während die Zahl der NROs in der ö ffentlichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit 
insgesamt bereits in den 1980er Jahren stark zunahm, stellen religiö se, insbesondere evangeli-
kale Wohlfahrtsorganisationen erst seit der politischen Wende von 1990 ein überproportional 
wachsendes Segment in der NRO-Landschaft dar. Gründe für die zunehmende Popularität der 
christlichen Helfer sind neben ihrer guten internationalen Vernetzung und lokalen Anbindung ihre 
groß en Ressourcen an Spendengeldern und ehrenamtlichen Mitarbeitern. Darüber hinaus halten 
manche Entwicklungsexperten sie für besonders geeignete Partner bei der Gestaltung von Bil-
dungs- und Gesundheitsprogrammen, insbesondere in der AIDS Prävention. Evangelikale NROs, 
so wird argumentiert, bilden ein wichtiges Verbindungsglied im globalen evangelikalen Netzwerk 
zwischen Nord und Süd: Sie befö rdern Kirchengründungen in Afrika, stellen andererseits aber 
auch eine wesentliche Ressource für die christlich-konservative politische Bewegung in Nordame-
rika dar. Erst im Herbst 2001 setzte der amerikanische Präsident George W. Bush die sogenann-
te „Faith-based and Community Initiative“ (FBCI) in Kraft, die religiö se Organisationen verstärkt 
für die heimische wie überseeische Wohlfahrt rekrutieren soll. Am Beispiel der Länder Kenia und 
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Uganda wird der Zusammenhang zwischen missionarischer Intervention und Privatisierungspoli-
tik im Bildungssektor diskutiert. Dabei wird auch der politische Einfluß  der evangelikalen Netz-
werke beleuchtet. 
 
Schlagwö rter 
 
Kenia, Uganda, Christliche Kirche, Religiö se Vereinigung, Politischer Protestantismus, Fundamenta-
lismus, Pfingstbewegung, Nichtregierungsorganisation, Auslandshilfe/Entwicklungshilfe, Interessen-
gruppe, USA, UNO, Private Bildungsentwicklung, Schulerziehung/ -bildung   
                  
 
 
Résumé 
 
Cet article examine l' implication politique et sociale d'une forme nouvelle de la mission chré-
tienne en Afrique subsaharienne: les organisations non-gouvernementales (ONG) évangéliques. 
Quand le nombre des ONGs actives dans la coopération au développement augmenta dans les 
1980s, les organisations religieuses, particulièrement les organisations évangéliques, augmenta 
deux fois plus vite que les ONGs séculaires. Les aides chrétiennes sont populaires parce qu'elles 
possèdent un réseau international bien établi avec des alliances locales, et des ressources vas-
tes et toujours renouvelées: des donations privées et une armée des collaborateurs volontaires. 
De plus, tant d'experts en développement trouvent qu'ils sont les partenaires privilégiés dans les 
domaines de l'éducation et de l'hygiène publique, notamment pour les campagnes contre 
HIV/SIDA. Les ONGs religieuses - ainsi qu'il est argumenté dans cet article - présentent un chaî-
non important dans le réseau missionnaire entre le nord et le sud: Ils sustentes la fondation 
d'églises en Afrique, mais autant ils constituent une ressource vitale pour le mouvement évangé-
lique conservateur aux Etats-Unis. En automne 2001, le Président américain George W. Bush ra-
tifia une initiative pour la promotion des organisations religieuses pour le bien public domestique 
et outre mer. La connexion entre les interventions missionnaires et la privatisation des secteurs 
publies de l'éducation, et l'influence politique du mouvement évangélique et son fondamenta-
lisme protestant , a été analysée à l'exemple du Kenya et de l'Ouganda.  
 
Mots-clé 
 
Kenya, Uganda, Eglise chrétienne, association religieuse, protestantisme politique, fondamenta-
lisme, pentecostalisme, organisation non-gouvernementale, aide a l'étranger/aide au développe-
ment, groupe d'intérêt, Etats-Unis, Nations Unies, éducation scolaire/formation scolaire, finance-
ment privé de l'éducation   
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